Evaluating board effectiveness: A review and framework for evaluation of corporate boards by Nordberg, Donald & Booth, R.
Evaluating board effectiveness: A review and framework for evaluation of 
corporate boards 
Donald Nordberg,* Rebecca Booth† 
British Academy of Management conference, Warwick, 2017 
Abstract: Board evaluations have emerged as an important tool in public policy and 
corporate practice for enhancing board effectiveness. This paper reviews the extensive 
literature on effectiveness and the emerging literature on evaluation to understand how the 
divide between two purposes of evaluation – improving board performance and creating 
accountability – interact with the two main methods of evaluation – internal and externally 
facilitated. It also integrates the literature of effectiveness and evaluation into an analytic 
framework for board evaluation. We believe this tool will contribute theoretical 
understanding of boards and their work, provide insights for the practice of boards and 
evaluators, and help policy formation by pointing out the limitations as well as benefits of 
various policy options.  
Keywords: Board evaluation, board effectiveness, corporate governance 
  
                                                 
*
 Associate Professor, Bournemouth University Business School 
†
 Independent 
Nordberg, Booth  Evaluating board effectiveness 
British Academy of Management  Page 1  
Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, and with greater force since the 2007-09 financial crisis, policy 
initiatives and shareholders in many countries have pressed the boards of companies to 
undertake regular, usually annual evaluations of their performance (Minichilli, Gabrielsson, 
& Huse, 2007). In places that followed the lead of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(FRC, 2010), they have also demanded that boards use external facilitators to ensure greater 
objectivity in the process.  
The push has met with considerable compliance (cf. Grant Thornton, 2011, 2016), but 
also with some push-back. Practitioner accounts suggest resistance, acquiescence, but also 
enthusiasm for a process traditionally associated with staff development and discipline rather 
than those in the upper echelons. This activity has also attracted small but growing research 
efforts concerning the purposes and practices of board evaluation. Scholars including Kiel 
and Nicholson (2005) see multiple benefits from conducting board evaluations, which can be 
categorised in two broad streams: external focused ones, aiming at enhancing accountability; 
and internal ones, aimed improvements to the operation of the board and its impact on the 
company’s operational and financial performance.  
The latter set of reasons relate to another, important stream of the corporate governance 
literature, more highly developed but with important aspects still contested: board 
effectiveness. Since the seminal paper by Forbes and Milliken (1999), many efforts have 
sought to identify the characteristics of both boards and directors and the processes through 
which they contribute to firm performance. Few studies have explored how the differing 
conceptualisations of board effectiveness map against the purposes and processes of board 
evaluation. Indeed, a recent paper asks a question pointing to its negative if nuanced answer, 
“Do board evaluations measure board effectiveness?” (Rasmussen, 2015). 
Drawing on a nascent literature, this paper seeks to address a related question: How do 
board evaluations in various forms address the need to improve board effectiveness? It 
reviews the literatures of both board effectiveness and board evaluation to articulate their 
assumptions and points of contention.  It seeks to establish connections between them and in 
so doing identifies points of pressure that may be better addressed by one or another method 
and process of board evaluation. In modelling the issues, it proposes a framework to 
structure the growing research interest in board evaluation.  
We believe this framework can guide the work of people engaged in board evaluations 
and boards who commission their work. For policy, the framework highlights a need for 
research concerning the degree of prescription that guidelines on board evaluation make 
before we have much evidence of whether the benefits outweigh any unintended 
consequences. 
The balance of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section we provide an 
overview of the work of board and the policy environment that has led to institutionalisation 
of board evaluations to frame the issues and highlight points of contention. After a 
discussion of the methods used to conduct the review, we examine how practitioners discuss 
board effectiveness and how scholars have attempted to conceptualise it since Forbes and 
Milliken (1999). We then explore the emerging literature on board evaluation. Integrating 
the two, the paper develops a revised model of board effectiveness, highlighting areas of 
particular concern for board evaluation processes, including ones the literature suggests 
would be better addressed by external facilitators. This model leads to development of a 
research agenda and a discussion of practice and policy implications. We conclude with 
observations about factors that practitioners, boards and facilitators, might consider in 
designing evaluation exercises.  
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Boards and the policy environment 
Repeated corporate governance crises around the world have often been attributed to 
failings of boards of directors (Deakin & Konzelmann, 2004; du Plessis, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 
2009; Lockhart, 2010; Petrovic, 2008; Turnbull & Pirson, 2012). These problems have led to 
changes in law, regulation and self-regulation through codes of conduct. The complexities of 
large businesses and the peculiarities of individual businesses and their commercial 
environments have made regulators reluctant to rely heavily on mandatory controls, 
favouring instead guidelines that leave much discretion to the companies’ own boards of 
directors.  
In so doing, however, policy has directed increasing attention to guidelines about how 
boards know whether they are using that discretion appropriately. Especially since the 
collapse of Enron and many other large enterprises in the early 2000s, and then after the 
global financial crisis in 2007-09, that attention has focused on the process of board 
evaluation, and with growing emphasis on evaluations conducted by neutral, external 
examiners.  
These policy initiatives have been faced with scepticism and resistance. Board 
deliberations are both sensitive and private, which raises questions about whether outsiders 
should be inside the process and what value they could add. But boards are also populated by 
people with strong wills and self-assurance, more accustomed to giving appraisals than 
receiving them. That raises questions about how receptive they would be to 
recommendations of an external facilitator.  
Concern arose initially in the 1990s alongside a new empirical focus on what happens 
inside boards (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995, 1998) and theoretically on what constitutes 
board effectiveness (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Warther, 1998). Interest in normative 
approaches intensified when public policy focused on board evaluation in the aftermath of 
what MacAvoy and Millstein (2003) called the recurrent crisis in corporate governance in 
the early 2000s, and in particular in the UK (Long, 2006).  
Given the limitations of law, regulation and codes, a shift in behaviour was needed. As 
boards of directors set the “tone from the top”, having boards undergo regular performance 
appraisals could instil greater thoughtfulness that could lead to a change in board culture 
(Ingley & van der Walt, 2002; Long, 2006; Minichilli et al., 2007). In Canada, the Toronto 
Stock Exchange urged evaluations of the CEO, directors and the board as a whole as early as 
1994 (Cadbury, 1999).  
This stream of thinking has become a feature of corporate governance regimes in many 
countries and informed codes for unlisted companies, partnerships and public sector 
organisations. It emanated as policy in the UK: The theme arose during consultations leading 
to development of the Cadbury Code (1992), and turned into a formal recommendation that 
all boards of major listed companies “should undertake a formal and rigorous annual 
evaluation of its own performance and that of its committees and individual directors” (FRC, 
2003, Principle A.6). That version of what had come to be called the “Combined Code” was 
informed by a government-sponsored review of non-executive directors (Higgs, 2003), 
which urged use of an external party to conduct board evaluations.  
Following the financial crisis of 2007-09, the drafting of the renamed UK Corporate 
Governance Code (FRC, 2010) formalised the Higgs advice into a recommendation that 
annual boards evaluations should be facilitated by external consultants at least every three 
years. The code applies only to the larger companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
but it was used as a model for a new codes used in many different settings, for listed 
companies in other countries, and for different types of unlisted businesses and corporate 
subsidiaries in the UK.  
Nordberg, Booth  Evaluating board effectiveness 
British Academy of Management  Page 3  
The theme has also been developed in UK regulatory reports, such as guidance on board 
effectiveness (FRC, 2011); the failure of HBOS (Bank of England, 2015), and corporate 
culture and boards (FRC, 2016), which cited behavioural dynamics at board level as an 
important influence on board effectiveness. These reports see a moderating effect of periodic 
assessment as mitigating poor board performance that can lead to firm and market failure.  
Board evaluation is seen in policy as a mechanism to assess the effectiveness of board 
and a way of looking at performance that acknowledges the confidentiality of board 
proceedings and the complexities of the issues require that boards enjoy a high degree of 
discretion in their decision-making. After describing the methods used in our review, we 
consider the dynamics of boards and view of what constitutes effectiveness and what we 
currently understand about processes of evaluation.  
Methods 
We used a variety of methods to explore each literature, starting with some general 
reading around the themes, and more focused examinations of topics that arose from it. We 
then undertook structured searches of the literatures of both effectiveness and evaluations, 
identifying the overlaps between them. We drew initially upon the EBSCO database and 
then for tighter coverage and to focus specifically on scholarly publications we used Scopus. 
We filtered for business and management to provide the definitive lists, with searches that 
involved content for titles, abstracts and keywords.  
With those items selected, we first examined the titles and abstracts to eliminate items 
where the central theme of the papers was out of our scope or where the papers focused on a 
narrow or normative application of the concepts to a specific domain (e.g. boards of health 
care agencies or organisations). 
The literature on board effectiveness is considerable and diverse and the expression itself 
is well established in the literature as a keyword or term of reference. The Scopus search for 
“board effectiveness” yielded 157 papers between 1987 and the end of 2016, 150 of them 
since Forbes and Milliken (1999). This sample contains theoretical analyses and empirical 
evidence, practitioner testimony and normative statements based on policy recommendations 
and experience. Of them 53 had the string “effectiv” in the title and another 23 in which the 
title raised issues that might concern effectiveness (e.g. “financing decisions as a source of 
conflict”).  
As noted above, research into board evaluation is nascent. A search in Scopus for “board 
evaluation” in titles, abstracts and keywords and limited to business and management 
literature and running until the end of 2016 yielded 33 items, the first in 1997. Two were 
notes about conference presentations, and only 17 had board evaluation itself as their focus. 
A search for “board assessment” OR “board appraisal” yielded another three. A wider search 
for “board AND evaluat” but limited by “corporate governance” yielded 86 articles, only 13 
of which directly concerned board evaluation, all represented in the earlier searches. Items 
that appeared on both lists (effectiveness AND evaluation) totalled 24, of which 16 were 
directly related to our inquiry and all represented in earlier searches.  
We supplemented these with some practitioner analyses from accountancy, consulting 
and search-and-selection firms. We also paid particular attention to a book chapter 
(Nicholson, Kiel, & Tunny, 2012), which examined works theorising of board process and 
effectiveness in building its survey of board evaluation. We then reviewed in outline the 76 
items on from the board effectiveness search, paying particular attention to ones that 
theorised the concept or sought to identify its components. Finally, we focused attention on 
the 17 papers concentrating of board evaluation, and related material.  
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Board effectiveness 
Boards are workgroups, but the nature of their work differs from that of operational 
groups. In theorising board cognition and effectiveness, Forbes and Milliken (1999, p. 492) 
write that boards differ from conventional groups in that they are “large, elite, and episodic 
decision-making groups that face complex tasks pertaining to strategic-issue processing”. 
Their size (typically a dozen or more) is larger than operational workgroups. Their episodic 
engagement owes in part to the presence of outside, or “non-executive” directors, who serve 
the company only part-time, and may therefore show less than full commitment to the group. 
Their elite make-up holds both the promise and threat associated with strong individuality. 
The size and individuality increase the inputs to complex decisions but constrain the ability 
to reach consensus. And because the issues they debate are strategic, affecting firm 
performance, their decisions can have a great impact.  
Moreover, boards occupy liminal spaces (Concannon & Nordberg, 2015), where 
hierarchy is (notionally) suspended and participants are (legally) equal. Moreover directors, 
and especially the non-executives common in the UK, perform two distinct and at times 
contradictory roles: service, in which they provide advice and counsel to management; and 
control, in which they supervise and discipline management, including those senior 
managers who are themselves directors (Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, & García-Cestona, 
2013; Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2013; Napoli, 2012).  
These different roles involve directors adopting multiple identities, which may at times 
conflict (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008). The “outside” non-executives become 
insiders, and the “inside” executives to step outside of their roles as managers. This role 
ambiguity, therefore, creates the liminality in which creativity can develop, but only by 
suspending the hierarchy conventionally used in discipline, thus differentiating the 
assessment of boards compared with other workgroups.  
This is not to say that boards are theoretically or empirically without hierarchy. But 
since Cadbury (1992), policy in the UK and in the many jurisdictions that have followed its 
lead, has sought to separate the role of chairman from CEO to counter the power of the CEO 
in the boardroom. Other policy moves, in particular since the crises in the early 2000s, have 
further eroded or even reversed the hierarchy by enhancing the role of independent non-
executive directors both in their proportion on boards and in their control of key board 
committees and functions.  
The distinctions between boards and conventional workgroups have implications for the 
dynamics of the interaction of their members and the processes they use. To understand that 
let us consider four theorised models of board effectiveness from Forbes and Milliken 
(1999); Nicholson and Kiel (2004), Leblanc and Gillies (2005), and Charas (2015) and 
related studies. An overview of their themes appears in Table 1. 
------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------ 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) identify key processes of corporate boards, including their 
effort norms and how they use the knowledge and skills available in the group. These are 
arguably quite similar to working in any group setting. The third element of board processes 
in Forbes and Milliken (1999), however, is more complex. The “cognitive conflict” they see 
as vital to challenging the view of senior managers and in particular the chief executive, even 
though it threatens cohesiveness. And cohesiveness is double-edged. They posit and invested 
U relationship with task performance; as boards grow in cohesiveness they can because too 
cosy for effective challenge to take place. This complex relationship is echoed in the later 
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scholarship of Levrau and van den Berghe (2007), who work in the setting of mainly 
continental European boards, mainly with non-executive supervisory boards. 
One benefit of the approach in Forbes and Milliken (1999) is that it seeks to identify 
elements that can either be verified externally or where suitable proxies have or could be 
developed. Board demography and the mix of knowledge and skills on the board yield 
information that is likely to affect the “black box” of board processes, which are difficult to 
observe. Effort norms can be estimated by the increasingly common corporate reporting of 
attendance at board and committee meetings. But such measures leave out two types of 
elements that have been prominent in policy and in the literature: board structures and the 
social characteristics of directors.  
Policy approaches in many countries have adopted structural mechanisms to strengthen 
particularly the monitoring role of boards, often with directives for corporate disclosure. 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) note the importance of structures in shaping the work of boards, 
while a historical view by Nordberg and McNulty (2013) shows its centrality in the 
development of the Cadbury Code (1992) in the UK. 
Structural mechanisms include elements such as the balance of executive and non-
executives directors, often called board independence (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Chen, 2011; 
Johanson & Østergren, 2010); CEO duality (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014); and the 
use and composition of board committees, for audit, remuneration, nominations or other 
purposes (ISG, 2017; Montagnon, 2016). McNulty, Florackis, and Ormrod (2012) extend the 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) model in considering the interplay of board structures with 
processes among financial institutions coping with the effects of the financial crisis. Such 
structures feature prominently in policy prescriptions for corporate governance as well as 
practice and theorising about it.  
In assessing board effectiveness, other scholars warn of the limitations of relying on 
structures and board composition elements in understanding effectiveness of boards (e.g. 
Roberts, 2002) and call attention to the social skills of directors as being of particular 
importance. Johnson, Schnatterly, and Hill (2013) call for more attention in research to 
human and social capital of directors as determinants of board effectiveness. Kim and 
Cannella (2008), for example, suggest that social capital is an important factor in director 
selection as it contributes to later board effectiveness. These are elements that are much 
more difficult to assess with publicly disclosed information.  
In their study of mainly Canadian boards, Leblanc and Gillies (2005) find that director 
effectiveness, defined as the ability of directors to influence outcomes, can be traced to three 
factors: their persuasiveness, the predictability of a director’s dissent and consensus, and 
whether a director’s orientation was individualistic or collectivist. Of these, persuasiveness is 
“by far the most important” (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005, p. 162), with non-persuasive ones seen 
by peers as “lone wolves” and “disagreeable”. Moreover, what they call functional directors 
(i.e. those who contributed to decision-making) all rank high in persuasiveness, but might 
rank high or low in the other categories of behaviour. Effective boards have a mix of dissent 
and consensus, and directors might be individualistic and suppressed collective interests. 
Read against the Forbes and Milliken (1999) framework, persuasiveness is a director 
characteristic that can help to overcome scepticism and build trust, thus reinforcing 
cohesiveness when challenged by cognitive conflict.  
Nicholson and Kiel (2004) offer a construct called “board intellectual capital”, a 
composite of board- and director-level factors, as contributing to effective decision-making.  
The board’s social and structural capital derives from human and social capital of the 
individual directors, and the cultural capital of those directors arising from their 
identification with the values and norms of the group. Like Leblanc and Gillies (2005), they 
focus attention on social interactions as central to board dynamics.  
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With similar intent, Charas (2015) posits that the “cultural intelligence” of directors 
plays an important role in board effectiveness, alongside demographic factors and the 
presence of knowledge and skills noted in Forbes and Milliken (1999). Her work draws upon 
Earley and Mosakowski (2004a), who theorised in the context of cross-border management 
that cultural intelligence seeks context-specific relationships involving cognition (“head”), 
energy (“heart”) and action (“body”) to  develop and express sensitivity to the dynamics of 
workgroups. It reflects “how able people are to empathize, work with, direct, and interact 
with other people” (Earley & Mosakowski, 2004b, p. 154). Cultural intelligence thus 
facilitates changes in behaviour owing to situational complexity (Triandis, 2006).  
Translated into the setting of boards, this characteristic of directors would seem to 
increase their ability to cope with the tensions between cognitive conflict and board 
cohesiveness. It helps, therefore, in judging how to prevent cohesiveness tipping into 
groupthink and to prevent cognitive conflict engendering affective conflict.  
Cultural intelligence involves characteristics of directors that contribute to board 
processes. Persuasiveness as well as the less important behavioural orientations in Leblanc 
and Gillies (2005) are also characteristics of directors. But they would seem to be aided by 
the presence of cultural intelligence and its sensitivity to others (see Figure 1), and be seen 
only through interaction. The social and cultural capital of directors in Nicholson and Kiel 
(2004) can also be read as facets of cultural intelligence.  
----------------- 
Place Figure 1 about here 
----------------- 
This points us towards a relationship, under-articulated in the Forbes and Milliken 
(1999) model, in which director characteristics influence effort norms, cognitive conflict and 
board cohesiveness, and perhaps the degree to which they use their knowledge and skills.  
Forbes and Milliken (1999) see the relationship between conflict and cohesion and 
central to board effectiveness.  But cognitive conflict works against the cohesiveness needed 
to keep their often large, elite and episodic membership headed towards a decision. Board 
cohesiveness and cognitive conflict conspire to undermine, in opposite directions, the 
conditions of simultaneous trust and scepticism that conventionally make possible the 
practice of peer evaluation. 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that boards develop coping routines to overcome the 
tension between their service and control functions (Nicholson, Pugliese, & Bezemer, 2017), 
which are influenced by cognitive conflict and cohesiveness Forbes and Milliken (1999). In 
a rare study analysing video evidence of board deliberations, Nicholson et al. (2017) found 
directors engaged in “systematic and routine behaviours that initially appear paradoxical”.  
Cultural intelligence, persuasiveness and the development of coping routines are 
characteristics and behaviour that are difficult to assess through public disclosure. They form 
pressure points that would seem to affect the processes of effort levels, boardroom challenge 
and the delivery of skills and knowledge central to board effectiveness. Doing so is difficult, 
however, without the ability of observe the board in action, of which the study by Nicholson 
et al. (2017) is a very rare example. From practical and policy perspectives, difficulties in 
gaining access place the onus on board evaluation.  
Evaluating boards 
According to Kiel and Nicholson (2005), the questions arising in board evaluation 
include: the objectives of the exercise; who will be evaluated (the unit or units of analysis, in 
effect: the board as a unit, individual directors, the chairman, the committees); what 
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subjects/aspects of board performance; whose views will be sought; using which techniques; 
what use will be made of the results; and who will do the evaluation. (For an overview of the 
literature see Table 2.) With recent concern in policy on the impact of internal versus 
external evaluation; we focus now on two of these: the uses of results, and who will do the 
evaluation.  
------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------ 
Uses of board evaluation 
The literature suggests two broad categories of uses of the outcomes of the evaluation, a) 
those internal to the board and aimed at improving effectiveness, and b) compliance with 
external expectations. Fetterman (2001) argues that the evaluator’s role is to develop, refine 
and improve those being evaluated. Evaluators can transform the relationship from judging 
performance to collaborating in its improvement. Long (2006), a specialist in board reviews, 
also argues that evaluation for internal purposes can encourage teamwork and improve 
leadership. That is, the experience of the evaluation itself contributes to directors’ 
identification with the board and the company, contributing to cohesiveness. If done 
candidly, this outcome suggests that the evaluation process can encourage challenge in the 
boardroom (cognitive conflict) while simultaneously building closeness of the board 
(cohesiveness).  
There is, however, a narrower and “symbolic” use, in the sense of the symbolic 
management that Westphal and Zajac (1998) see in cynical uses of compliance with “good” 
corporate governance precepts to reduce pressure from shareholders. The recent requirement 
for reporting about board evaluations, and about the use of external evaluators, risks adding 
another box to tick, a practice regulators decry (e.g. FRC, 2015).  
The nascent empirical literature supports the contention that evaluation can change 
board dynamics. A quantitative study analysed survey data from company secretaries of 29 
UK listed companies concerning whether and if what form evaluations took place and with 
want consequences (Dulewicz & Herbert, 2008). It found, among other things, that 
evaluations led to the decision of a director to resign in a third of the cases of resignation 
(cited in Nicholson et al., 2012). The limited sample size raises questions about how to 
interpret the responses.  
In a study of board dynamics, Vandebeek, Voordeckers, Lambrechts, and Huybrechts 
(2016) viewed board evaluations as moderating the negative effect of the faultline between 
family/non-family directors on performance of Belgian family-controlled firms. They saw 
evaluations helping to erode hierarchy and heighten simultaneously challenge and 
cohesiveness.  
Martinov-Bennie, Soh, and Tweedie (2015) explored the evaluation of audit committees 
in large Australian companies, identifying a need for a nuanced understanding of members 
and their dynamics, instead of simple tests of independence. It points more generally to a 
view that in assessing board performance, externally verifiable data about board composition 
and structure are poor substitutes for observing the inner workings of a board. 
But this is not the only possible outcome. A questionnaire-and-interview study of boards 
of Norwegian listed companies found that directors saw evaluation serving hygienic 
purposes (i.e. conforming to the context of demands for board evaluation) more than 
contributing to the content of board deliberations or enhancing board performance 
(Rasmussen, 2015). This suggests that directors may see evaluations as serving dominantly 
cosmetic goals, irrespective of the processes involved or who evaluates the board.  
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Who evaluates 
Boards sit at the top of corporate hierarchies, after which there is no point of appeal. As 
board evaluation was beginning to emerge as a corporate governance imperative, Conger, 
Finegold, and Lawler (1998) observed: “The most obvious impediment to periodic board 
evaluations is that no one can perform them but the board itself.” As discussed above, 
however, this assertion has been overtaken by events, including the Higgs Review (2003) 
and its ripple effect in countries other than the UK.  
Academic and practitioner literature provides some guidance. Huse (2005) suggests that 
to understand board behaviour, board processes need to be observed and assessed to be able 
to explain the nature of interactions, influencing forces and formal and informal structures 
including leadership and the decision-making culture. Those evaluating should be cognisant 
of the decision-making environment and influences on the company and the board (Chioatto, 
2015).  Knowing which issues need to be tackled will help determine whether the board will 
benefit from internal or external evaluation. Ingley and van der Walt (2002) discuss the 
discomfort directors feel about evaluation and the politics of horizontal as opposed to 
vertical appraisal. 
Both Kiel and Nicholson (2005) and Minichilli et al. (2007) identify a range of options, 
from the chairman conducting evaluations, to board committees, to a lead non-executive 
director, to general advisers (e.g. professional services firms) or specialists (e.g. board 
evaluation firms). We focus here on the three categories that embrace the others: chair 
evaluation, internal and collective self-evaluation, and externally facilitated evaluation.  
Internal self-evaluation. Minichilli et al. (2007) view self-evaluation as a valuable tool  
for improvement as it provides prescribed time and space for self-reflection on board 
processes and internal culture, such as decision-making, trust, emotions and board 
interactions (Minichilli et al., 2007). Boards need to measure individual director and group 
competencies (Cascio, 2004), supplemented by upward feedback and peer review (Garratt, 
1999). The ability to be open with feelings during the self-evaluation of the board and its 
members  is provided through confidentiality (Minichilli et al., 2007); however internal 
evaluation prevents openness and is a barrier to revealing problematic aspects of the board 
dynamics (Ungureanu, 2013). 
Internal evaluation removes concerns of confidentiality (Rasmussen, 2015).  Kiel and 
Nicholson (2005) argue that individual evaluation provides for “open and honest feedback”; 
however practitioner observation advises that with established trust “confidential third-party 
interviews with each director produced candid, positive and self-critical results” (Kenny, 
2016, p. 9). 
Writing in a general context of personal psychology, Billow (2011) says that self-
awareness remains tentative, uncertain and evolving, however;  self-knowledge revises itself 
constantly due to stimuli from the environment but remains subjective. Carson and Langer 
(2006) advise that achievement of mindfulness of the self plays an important role in 
adaptability to both environment and context to understanding differing perspectives. In 
addition, awareness of the impact and influence an individual can have on others is a critical 
component to effective leadership of groups (Taylor, 2010).  
External evaluation and evaluators. Practitioner articles, theorists and policy 
directives assert that effective evaluation of behaviour requires an external view (e.g. 
Pitcher, 2014). With outside experts who have no vested interest but understand behavioural 
and group issues, assumptions of monolithic behaviour in group decision-making are 
removed (Schwartz-Ziv & Weisbach, 2013), which can help in recognising dysfunctional 
group dynamics (Conger et al., 1998). Inviting the evaluator to attend meetings on a regular 
basis can prevent groupthink (Bernthal & Insko, 1993). External evaluation can reduce 
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subjectivity and possible self-interest present in self-evaluations, thus, the benefit of an 
external evaluator is that they can provide impartiality (Conger et al., 1998). According to 
Machold and Farquhar (2013, p. 161),“an “informed outsider” could challenge “deep-routed 
beliefs” of board members and offered “opportunities for reflection to both the researchers 
and the board members”.  
But the process has drawbacks as well. Minichilli et al. (2007, p. 618) note that “few 
boards have traditionally been willing to accept an external evaluator present during their 
discussions”. However, it seems likely that in the decade since then, with the financial crisis 
and increased pressure for scrutiny, behaviour and perhaps attitudes have changed.  More 
importantly, there is a danger boards or individual directors may react to observation by 
changing behaviour, throwing the validity of the evaluation into doubt. 
What overcomes objections to external evaluation is motivation. Kiel and Nicholson 
(2005) argue that a desire within the board for greater transparency and accountability 
increases willingness to undertake external assistance. Minichilli et al. (2007) see stronger 
motivation when a greater understanding of the workings of the group is required.  
Writing in the context of general, rather than board-specific evaluation, Ensminger, 
Kallemeyn, Rempert, Wade, and Polanin (2015) suggest that the role of evaluator resembles 
that of a coach, whose aim is to develop and provide guidance on achieving the participants’ 
optimum performance from their abilities, a view that has practitioner support (Independent 
Audit, 2016).  
What an external evaluator may not be told during the interviews or observe during the 
boardroom sessions is the political behaviour that only the directors will be aware of as it 
takes place outside of the boardroom. Bailey and Peck (2013) suggest that political 
behaviour, such as lobbying and behind the scenes coalition-building, influences the 
boardroom dynamics. That can influence board decision-making, which is “contingent upon 
the relative power and relationships among various coalitions of internal and external actors” 
(van Ees, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2009, p. 315). An evaluator needs to be alert to politics 
within the group and the history of the dynamics informing the relevant relationships. While 
such insights do not require an external evaluator, internal methods of conducting 
evaluations provide little assurance of a freedom from politics.  
Evaluation by chair – a hybrid model? Practitioner accounts suggest that a common 
method of board evaluation is for the chairman to evaluate personally the performance of 
directors, committees and the board as a whole. We have found no study that focuses on this 
approach specifically, but the practice arguably combines the confidentiality of internal 
evaluation with some degree of the distance provided by external facilitators. It could as 
easily lack the objectivity, be subject to the politics, and damage the already tense 
relationship between boardroom challenge and the sense of common purpose.  
Normative writers have suggested that a lead non-executive director or combination of 
directors might take responsibility for evaluating the chair (cf. Neubauer, 1997). But that 
raises uncomfortable questions of who evaluates the evaluator (Pitcher, 2014), with its 
echoes of the age-old problem in life (Juvenal, 1999) as well as corporate governance 
(Williams, 1999): who guards the guardians? Board evaluation by the chair might then prove 
less a hybrid solution and more a different version of the same problem. This study does not 
address that question directly, though we are cognisant that wide use of this approach makes 
it a matter of importance. We return to it in our discussion and recommendations for 
research.  
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A framework for board evaluation 
The discussion of board effectiveness and the purposes and methods of board evaluation 
help to identify certain pressure points in evaluation (Figure 2), by which we mean the 
factors and relationships between them where in-person evaluation, and more specifically 
evaluation through external facilitation, are likely to be most beneficial. In particular, it 
seems important to evaluate whether directors have the cultural intelligence, that is, the 
sensitivity to others, to adapt their behaviour when cognitive conflict threatens board 
cohesiveness. Similarly, evaluations should look for signs of the absence of persuasiveness, 
which can increase tensions and undermine cohesiveness leading to dysfunctional behaviour 
that might translate cognitive conflict into affective conflict.  
----------------- 
Place Figure 2 about here 
----------------- 
What and how to evaluate. Corporate disclosures provide growing information about 
boards and their processes. We know a lot about not just about board demography and 
structures, but also about the effort norms they observe. Assessing the social capital of 
directors may be possible to an extent from the outside, as studies of director connectedness 
on board interlocks and social networks have shown. But insofar as social capital involves 
the interpersonal relations on the board, which lead to cognitive conflict and board 
cohesiveness, the proxies used in such outside methods would seem to be of little use.  
Showing how these attributes contribute to the cultural intelligence (Charas, 2015; 
Earley & Mosakowski, 2004a; Triandis, 2006) or the persuasiveness seen by Leblanc and 
Gillies (2005) needs to be judged directly, either through observation or access to 
assessments conducted with individual directors. Such personal characteristics may be 
difficult to judge in either peer-based evaluations or those using the board chairman as the 
evaluator. It would seem to be even more difficult to discuss the results without the ability to 
utilise the impartiality of the external evaluator. 
The literature further suggests that how these director social characteristics relate to 
board processes and in particular the processes of cognitive conflict and use of knowledge 
and skills in the Forbes and Milliken (1999) model are crucial to board evaluation. Doing so 
seems to point not just to external evaluation but also more ethnographic approaches of 
board observation, such as used in the research by Samra-Fredericks (2000), whether 
working regularly within the boardroom as a trusted outsider or in one-off exercises along 
the lines conducted by Nicholson et al. (2017). 
Similarly how director social characteristics play into board cohesiveness and into the 
difficult relationship between cohesiveness and cognitive conflict argues for external 
evaluation. While a skilled chairman, whose persuasiveness (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005) 
signals sensitivity to the social setting of the board, the chair is still involved in the decision 
process. Evaluating those tense situations would be difficult.  
When to evaluate. As we have seen, the policy environment in many countries is 
pressing for regular board evaluations, generally annually, and for externally facilitated ones 
perhaps less frequently, such as the three-yearly ones prescribed in guidance to larger 
companies operating under the UK Corporate Governance Code. By their regularity such 
periodic recommendations seem to satisfy the need for compliance and external 
accountability. But as the discussion above has indicated, the value of compliance-oriented 
evaluation may lead to symbolic management and discourage having external evaluators 
present at the time when important decisions are on the board’s agenda.  
One of the issues this review raises is therefore whether boards might be better advised 
to conduct evaluations not so much periodically, but when serious issues feature 
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prominently. Boards might well feel it a distraction to have an extra body in the room during 
the most sensitive decision-making, however well trusted that person might be. But learning 
about the sources of conflict, whether cognitive or affective in nature, and what issues 
excessive cohesiveness brings would be better observed and managed in a setting of 
important decisions. Mellahi (2005) found that behavioural dynamics was an influencing 
factor in the decision-making leading up to the failure of Australian firm HIH. Therefore, 
research might help us learn whether evaluations undertaken in the moderate heat of 
important decisions can improve later outcomes when existential issues arise.  
Synthesis and research directions 
Synthesising these views, we can set the two purposes of board evaluation (external 
accountability and internal improvement) against the two principal methods of evaluation 
(internally conducted and externally facilitated). The practitioner and theoretical literature 
suggests that internally conducted evaluations, gathering of basic information can facilitate 
externally focused accountability and compliance, while externally facilitated evaluations 
can accelerate internal improvements when combined with trust in the process. Each focuses 
on different factors identified as contributing to board effectiveness (see Table 3). 
------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------ 
A research agenda for board improvement 
As we have discussed, the limited literature on board evaluation suggests that internal, 
self-evaluation takes different forms, including self- and peer-assessment or evaluation 
conducted by the chairman. External evaluation holds the promise of greater objectivity but 
with risks. But the absence of evidence and the importance of board improvement motivating 
board evaluation points to a need for more systematic research.  
Internal evaluation. The literature reviewed here suggests internal evaluation can help 
in diagnosing problems building in the difficult relationship between cognitive conflict and 
board cohesiveness and in particular for assessing reasons for deficits in the use of 
knowledge and skills. We see a lack of evidence to support this claim, however, no doubt 
down to the well-known difficulties in studying boards in action let alone boards and 
directors in critical self-reflection. Qualitative research can illuminate the processes and 
attitudes that develop through the practice of board evaluation and help us better to identify 
the benefits and limitations of this approach. It could also help address questions about the 
efficacy of annual evaluation advocated in policy and based on the cycle of corporate 
financial reporting and modelled on annual, budget- and pay-related and employee 
appraisals, which may not match the purposes of board and director development. These 
insights might then inform to conduct survey-based research to establish a firmer evidence 
base of practices-in-use and their effectiveness and deficiencies.  
The practice of board evaluation conducted by the chairman also required specific 
research. Anecdotal evidence suggests it is one of the most common methods, in particular 
among companies that have adopted the UK-style separation of roles, rather than CEO 
duality. But the chairman may not be neutral; insofar as the chair steers the work of 
nominations the occupant of that post may contribute to dysfunctional as well as functional 
board dynamics. If so, these factors too suggests we need to understand better the 
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comparative benefits and drawback of chair-led evaluations and those undertaken through 
external facilitation.  
External evaluation. The literature on board effectiveness also lends support to 
assertions that internal reviews lack objectivity. More specifically, the framework developed 
in this paper points to a need in board evaluation to detect and interpret deficits in cultural 
and emotional intelligence, social capital, and persuasiveness that the literature associates 
with board effectiveness. It also seems to lack the opportunity for use of the evaluator-as-
coach to enhance individual director performance (Ensminger et al., 2015). Case study-based 
research can investigate the varieties of processes and evaluation techniques in use and 
document some of contingencies associated with special circumstances (i.e. low, medium or 
high tension) and outcomes when board evaluation takes place.  
Moreover, external facilitators are much better placed to identify problem areas that 
receive scant if any attention in the literature reviewed here. For example, the doyen of 
academic study of corporate governance, Bob Tricker, described his interest in the field as 
arising from noticing the divisive cliques and power plays at work on the council of a 
company incorporated within the University of Oxford (Tricker, 2015). The problem of 
“divisive cliques” and other dysfunctional practices in boards is something an external 
facilitator is in privileged position to solve. Research into external facilitation might collect 
such insights  to deepen our understanding of board as well as to improve board practice and 
the practice of facilitation. 
A research agenda for compliance and accountability  
The policy push for board evaluations, which was motivated by repeated waves of 
corporate malfeasance among large, listed corporations. As such policy sees such 
evaluations as a way to enhance the accountability of boards to their investors. While written 
largely from the perspective of equity investors’ needs, they might also apply to providers of 
debt capital. Such actions help not only to improve task performance, after all, but also to 
build confidence of those outside that such action is being undertaken, and undertaken 
seriously. But it is difficult to determine whether the effort is merely for compliance.  
Internal evaluation. Both practitioner and academic accounts suggest that, performed in 
a conscientious and constructive way, boards’ self-evaluation can generate information with 
implications for investors. While such information is rarely disclosed, cognitive conflict does 
occasionally become public knowledge when it spills out in the form of leaks about 
boardroom dissent or open hostility between directors, with implications for firm value and 
strategy.  The justifications of board improvement also suggest that reporting publicly about 
them may reduce the level of shock as well as the severity of disagreement. But the 
sensitivity of the information argues against detailed disclosure.  
These observations point to a need for research with investors over the adequacy of 
current reporting measures about the observable characteristics of board effectiveness and 
whether additional outputs from internal evaluation processes might help promote 
understanding of board effectiveness without jeopardising material and private information. 
For example, many companies’ disclosures of frequency and attendance of board and 
committee meeting go some way to appreciating the effort norms identified in Forbes and 
Milliken (1999). Research with investment managers might help establish the usefulness of 
disclosures concerning the justifications for or remedial actions taken when effort appears to 
fall below the norm. Similar questions could be raised about other board characteristics or 
processes that become the subject of internal board discussion and evaluation.  
External evaluation. The use of an external facilitator for board evaluations is 
increasingly a reporting requirement and a signal of the adoption of best practice. Such 
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reports are increasingly used as a metric of corporate governance by governance ratings 
agencies that assist investment managers with their voting decisions. Research with 
investment managers could help to establish the extent to which an externally led process has 
been undertaken is helpful and whether details of the facilitators or some form of assurance 
statement from them changes their judgement. In particular in this regard it would be useful 
for research to distinguish between the types of uses, whether for investment decisions (i.e. 
buy-sell-hold; lend-or-not), voting decisions, or understanding the need for and timing of 
investor engagement and stewardship (Martin, Casson, & Nisar, 2007; McNulty & 
Nordberg, 2016).  
This analysis also suggests that using external evaluation for compliance with external 
accountability can be a waste of resources and point to a missed opportunity for 
improvement. If compliance with policy targets slips into symbolic management, the 
appearance of best practice may even send false signals (Westphal & Zajac, 1998). Here 
research with boards as well as investment managers would help to distinguish the frequency 
and perception of such actions, as a warning about the limitations of policy prescriptions for 
board evaluation.  
Conducting the research agenda 
In all four cases outlined in Table 3, this paper suggests that further research would help 
corporations deal with needs for board improvement and external accountability. The policy 
agenda would also benefit from a better understanding the limitations as well as the 
possibilities of specifying board processes and setting reporting requirements about the steps 
taken in response to policy. Sponsorship of such work by professional bodies like the 
Society for Corporate Governance in the US or the Institute of Company Secretaries and 
Administrators in the UK could help overcome barriers to access and benefit both 
corporations themselves and policymakers. In particular, the research agenda outlined here 
would benefit from a combination of qualitative, ethnographic and interview-based research, 
survey-based study of practices and effects-based quantitative work on the relationship 
between board evaluation and various measures of board effectiveness and investor actions.  
A potential extension of such research concerns the use of evaluations for improving the 
performance of boards on private companies and non-corporate entities like charities, social 
enterprises and government agencies, and even boards of subsidiaries of larger corporations. 
Many of these have adopted corporate governance practices designed for listed companies, 
and anecdotal evidence as well as corners of the growing literature on board evaluations (see 
“specialist themes” in Table 2) suggests these too would benefit from attention to some of 
the research ideas sketched above.  
Neither the literature reviewed here nor the research agenda we have outlined considers 
those cost of board evaluation. In relation to the revenues of a large listed company they are 
probably insignificant, but they become more so the smaller the enterprise. As a proportion 
of the operating costs of the board itself they can be large, through both external facilitation 
and in director time. Any research undertaken could help us also to understand the benefits 
and costs.  
Conclusions 
Board evaluation is firmly on the agenda of corporations, policymakers and academics. 
This paper makes some tentative steps towards developing a theory of board evaluation and 
its potential for impact on the elusive problems associated with understanding how director 
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characteristics and board processes and structures contribute to effective deliberations. In 
highlighting the internally- and externally-facing purposes of evaluations and the differences 
made through the two main contrasting methods of evaluating, it points to a research agenda 
of academic interest but also of importance to corporations and policy in corporate reporting 
and governance.  
These four combinations cannot be quite so easily separated as the discussion here might 
make them seem. The policy direction of regular internal evaluation punctuated by external 
facilitation shows there is a transfer between the two approaches, and thus a dynamic that 
needs to be understood. Moreover, the internal purposes of evaluation ought in some way to 
inform the external, accountability-focused ones.  
Finally, by adapting and integrating different frameworks of board effectiveness we have 
provided an analytic tool that can be used to explain some of the unanswered questions in the 
developing literature of board evaluation. We think it also has practical uses for companies 
seeking to undertake board evaluations and for policymakers in understanding the limitations 
and even unintended consequences of mandating use of the practice. For those involved in 
the work of board evaluation – whether internally conducted or externally facilitated – with 
further development this tool can provide a template for the conduct of board evaluations 
that can add value as well as highlight potential areas of risk.  
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Director characteristics, cognition, processes 
Cognition and processes, 
highlighting the tensions 
between boardroom challenges 




Warther (1998); van den Berghe and 
Levrau (2004); Levrau and van den 
Berghe (2007) 





Kim and Cannella (2008); Johnson et al. 
(2013) 
Sensitivity; cultural intelligence Charas 
(2015) 
Earley and Mosakowski (2004a); Triandis 
(2006); Roberts (2002) 
Director persuasiveness Leblanc and 
Gillies 
(2005) 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1996) 
Structures, processes 
Firm and institutional 
contingencies affecting the 





D'Amato and Gallo (2016); Schmidt and 
Brauer (2006); Cornforth (2001); Del 
Guercio, Dann, and Partch (2003); Dahya 
and Travlos (2000); McNulty et al. (2012) 
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General accounts of evaluation purposes and processes (Daily & Dalton, 
2003; Ingley & van der Walt, 2002; Kiel & Nicholson, 2005; Long, 2006; 
Minichilli et al., 2007; Nicholson et al., 2012) 
Shortcomings (Rasmussen, 2015) 
Whom? Evaluation of the board as an entity (Dulewicz & Herbert, 2008; Leblanc, 
2002) 
Individual directors (Epstein & Roy, 2004; Heracleous & Luh Luh, 2002) 
Chair (Neubauer, 1997) 
CEO (Epstein & Roy, 2005) 
Committees (Martinov-Bennie et al., 2015) 
Why? Performance improvement (Conger, 2002; Conger et al., 1998; Long, 2006) 
Compliance (Rasmussen, 2015) 
How? Self-evaluation (Cascio, 2004; McIntyre & Murphy, 2007) 
External evaluation (Machold & Farquhar, 2013; Schwartz-Ziv & Weisbach, 
2013) 
Choices in evaluation method (Kiel & Nicholson, 2005; Long, 2006; 
Minichilli et al., 2007; Pitcher, 2014) 
Specialist 
themes 
Financial services (Groothuis, Wijngaards, & Khan, 2013) 
Family firms (Vandebeek et al., 2016) 
Nordic football clubs (Brunzell & Söderman, 2012) 
Municipally owned firms, as evaluated by the researcher (Sponbergs, 2007) 
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Table 3 - Purpose and method of board evaluation 
  Method of evaluation 


















Survey data for corporate 
reporting of basic information 
(e.g. board demography, proxies 
for effort norms, presence of 
knowledge, skills) 




Self-evaluation for diagnosis of 
potential concerns (signs of 
conflict; signs of excessive 
cohesiveness; use of knowledge 
and skills) 
Diagnosis of insufficient or 
excessive cognitive conflict or 
cohesiveness; assessment of 
director social capital, 
persuasiveness, cultural 
intelligence; sources and 
outcomes of interplay between 
social capital, cultural intelligence, 
persuasiveness, etc. on cognitive 
conflict, cohesiveness 
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Figure 2: Pressure points in board evaluation 
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